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NOTES AND COMMENTS
cluded. The Commission strongly urges that
guilt and punishment be treated separately 55
because they feel that oftentimes a jury will
agree that the defendant is guilty of first-
degree murder, but individual members of
the jury will disagree as to whether the de-
fendant is deserving of death. This, they
suggest, results in an influencing of the
eventual verdict and hence the consequent
verdict is not expressive of what the jurors
truly believe the facts establish. It seems rea-
sonable to assume that individual treatment
of guilt and punishment will reduce consid-
erably any obstruction of true fact-finding
which the present system of dual considera-
55 Id. at 7.
Recent Decision:
Defamatory Broadcast
New Cause of Action
With the advent of commercial radio
and television, novel factual situations in
the area of defamation have been created
by both media. As a result, some courts
have had difficulty in determining whether
defamatory broadcasts fall within the tra-
ditional categories of libel and slander.
In a recent decision, American Broad-
casting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simp-
son,, the Georgia Court of Appeals was
faced with an alleged defamation resulting
from the telecast of a dramatic presenta-
tion. In an episode of "The Untouchables,"
in which Alphonse Capone was depicted as
being transported by a railway train to Al-
catraz, a single guard was shown accepting
a bribe for his aid in Capone's attempt to
1 106 Ga. App. 230, 126 S.E.2d 873 (1962).
tion may produce.
Conclusion
Since it is clear that the most recent data
are far from conclusive as to the beneficial
consequences of abolition, and since there
exists considerable dispute regarding a
binding moral standard which must be ad-
hered to, it appears that the most reasonable
and cautious approach is not complete abo-
lition but the wise application of a discre-
tionary death penalty. The Commission's
proposed bill is, in some respects, almost
revolutionary and yet, upon a sober delib-
eration of all the statistics and contentions,
it seems the most practicable solution to an
age-old problem.
escape. There were two men who had, in
fact, worked inside Capone's car: plaintiff
and the captain of the guard. The Court
held that since a defamatory broadcast con-
tains elements of both libel and slander,
such a broadcast constitutes a new cause of
action which the Court termed "defama-
cast." Since such a broadcast has an im-
mense capacity for harm, it was held to be
actionable per se. The Court also stated
that the plaintiff could show that he was
the guard referred to either through ex-
trinsic facts or by merely establishing that
he was one of the two-man group.
Defamation is the result of the publica-
tion to others of false statements which in-
jure the individual's name and reputation
and lower his standing in the community.'
2 PROSSER, TORTS 574 (2d ed. 1955); SEELMAN,
LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER IN THE STATE OF NEW
YORK 1 (1933); SPRING, RISKS AND RIGHTS IN
PUBLISHING, TELEVISION, RADIO, MOTION PIC-
Originally, the common-law action on the
case, as it existed in the sixteenth century,
conceived of no distinctions between oral
and written defamation and applied the
same standards to both.3 The action for
written defamation, termed libel, was intro-
duced into the common law by the Star
Chamber.4 When the common-law courts
assumed jurisdiction over spoken defama-
tion, termed slander, recovery was allowed
only in those cases where there was allega-
tion and proof of special damages,5 except
in certain classes of cases where damages
would be presumed.6  When the Star
TURES, ADVERTISING, AND THE THEATER 41 (2d ed.
1956); Newhouse, Defamation By Radio: A New
Tort, 17 ORE. L. REV. 314 (1938); Note, 69
HARV. L. REV. 877 (1956).
3Hartmann v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 303, 73
N.E.2d 30, 33 (1947); 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS
372 (1956). For an excellent discussion of the
early history of the law of defamation, see Veeder,
The History and Theory of the Law of Defama-
tion, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 546 (1903); 3 RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 568, comment b (1938).
4The Star Chamber accomplished this by adopt-
ing the Roman Law and adapting it to its own
purposes. But in the Roman Law, distinctions be-
tween defamatory statements were based upon the
manner and extent of publication and not between
speech and writing. Veeder, supra note 3, at 563-
64.
"By special damages is meant definite, concrete,
and specific proof of injury. Moreover, the injury
must result in specific monetary loss." SPRING, Op.
cit. supra note 2, at 43.
6 Slander which is actionable without proof of
special damages is slander per se. There are four
instances of slander per se: the charge of serious
crime, Brooker v. Coffin, 5 Johns. 188, 191, 4 Am.
Dec. 337, 338 (N.Y. 1809); HARPER & JAMES, Op.
cit. supra note 3, at 377; 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 571 (1938); the imputation of a loathsome dis-
ease, Williams v. Holdredge, 22 Barb. 396, 399
(N.Y. 1854); statements affecting one in his trade,
business or profession, Rager v. McCloskey, 305
N.Y. 75, 79, 111 N.E.2d 214, 216 (1953); HARPER
& JAMES, op. cit. supra note 3, at 381; 3 RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 573 (1938); the imputation of un-
chastity to a woman, Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah
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Chamber was abolished, the distinction
between oral and written defamation was
preserved.7 This distinction was a meaning-
ful one because libel was an act from which
damages were conclusively presumed,"
whereas, as indicated, slander required al-
legation and proof of special damages, un-
less the remarks were slanderous per se.9
Where the defamation has occurred as a
result of a radio broadcast, the courts have
construed a defamatory remark read from a
script as a libel;10 if the same remark were
impromptu, it has been held to be a slan-
der." With regard to television broadcasts,
certain analogies may be drawn to the prob-
lems arising from defamation by motion
pictures because of the similarity in visual
and sound aspects of both media.1 2 In ap-
122, 247 P.2d 264 (1952); HARPER & JAMES, op.
cit. supra note 3, at 386; 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 574 (1938).
This distinction was severely criticized but it was
felt that so great was the weight of precedent that
it could not be ignored. Thorley v. Lord Kerry, 4
Taunt. 355, 366, 128 Eng. Rep. 367, 371 (1812).
However, at least one court has decided that there
should be no distinction between oral and written
defamation. Grein v. La Poma, 54 Wash. 2d 844,
-, 340 P.2d 766, 768 (1959).
8 Henn, "Libel-By-Extrinsic-Fact," 47 CORNELL
L.Q. 14, 17 (1961).
9 MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 113 (1935).
10Hartmann v. Winchell, supra note 3.
1 Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 299 N.Y.
Supp. 188 (Sup. Ct. 1937). Some commentators
classify all defamation by radio as libel. SEELMAN,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 3; SPRING, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 47; Vold, The Basis for Liability for
Defamation by Radio, 19 MINN. L. REV. 611, 613
(1935). The distinction between defamatory re-
marks read from a script and those that are im-
promptu has been severely criticized because it- is
immaterial to the radio listener whether the words
are read or ad libbed. Donnelly, Defamation by
Radio: A Reconsideration, 34 IOWA L. REV. 12,
15 (1948).
12 Barry, Radio, Television and the Law of Defa-
mation, 23 AUSTL. L.J. 203, 212 (1949); Note,
42 VA. L. REV. 63, 73 (1956).
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plying the law of defamation to motion pic-
tures, defamatory matter appearing on the
screen is treated as libel.13 However, it has
been suggested that the motion picture cases
should be applied to defamation by televi-
sion only when the telecast consists of a
filmed or otherwise recorded program
because a "live" telecast more closely re-
sembles a radio broadcast and the rules de-
veloped therefor should be applicable.
14
The Court, in the principal case, cogni-
zant of the script-impromptu test applied to
defamatory broadcasts, rejected it on the
grounds that the listener or viewer is apa-
thetic, and, in most instances, ignorant as to
the employment of a script. The second and
perhaps more important ground for rejec-
tion was the fact that the broadcast's capac-
ity for harm was not lessened by the use or
non-use of a script.15
Having rejected this prevailing test as to
whether a broadcasted defamatory state-
ment is a libel or a slander, the Court then
proceeded to reject the categorization of
defamation as either libel or slander. In-
stead, the Court created a new cause of
action which is applicable to all defamatory
broadcasts. The Court termed it "defama-
cast" and held it to be actionable per se. 6
13 Yousoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures,
[1934] 50 T.L.R. 581. Motion pictures have been
classified as libel because film is similar to a writ-
ing and the sound track is merely ancillary to it.
Ibid.
"4 43 CORNELL L.Q. 320 (1957).
1 For a discussion of "capacity for harm," see
Donnelly, supra note 11, at 18; Finlay, Defama-
tion by Radio, 19 CAN. B. REv. 353, 359-60
(1941); Note, 42 VA. L. REV. 63, 66 (1956). The
permanence of form test was popularized by Mr.
Justice, then Chief Judge, Cardozo in Ostrowe v.
Lee, 256 N.Y. 36, 175 N.E. 505 (1931). "What
gives sting to the writing is its permanence of
form." Id. at 39, 175 N.E. at 506.
1G However, some writers have taken the position
The creation of this new cause of action was
grounded upon the common law and statu-
tory construction.
The unique faculty of the common law
has been its ability to adjust to the complex-
ities of modern civilization and the problems
that are coexistent with it."' Rather than
being bound by prior concepts of libel and
slander, the Court felt that the realistic ap-
proach is to recognize that defamation by
broadcast inherently involves elements of
both libel and slander.' Therefore, since
it has elements of both, it cannot be easily
subsumed under either category.
By construing a Georgia statute19 applica-
ble to defamatory broadcasts by either a
sound or visual broadcasting station, the
Court indicated that the legislature appreci-
ated that defamation by broadcast is sui
generis. The statute refers to defamation by
broadcast as a defamatory statement. Since
the legislature did not classify a defamatory
that only nominal damages should be recovered in
all defamation actions unless the extent of the
damages could be shown. E.g., Courtney, Absurdi-
ties of the Law of Slander and Libel, 36 AM. L.
REv. 552, 564 (1904). Another view is that all
defamation is actionable without showing any
actual damages. Paton, Reform and the English
Law of Defamation, 33 ILL. L. REV. 669, 670
(1939).
1 Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156, 164, 140
N.E. 227, 230 (1923).
18,"It [radio] was not conceived nor dreamed of
when the law of libel and slander was being for-
mulated. ... [A]s defamation by radio possesses
many attributes of both libel and slander, but
differs from each, it might be regarded as a dis-
tinct form of action." Summit Hotel Co. v. Na-
tional Brodcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 200, 8 A.2d
302, 310 (1939); Newhouse, Defamation by
Radio: A New Tort, 17 ORE. L. REV. 314 (1938).
19 GA. CODE ANN. § 105-712 (1956); see Leflar,
Radio and TV Defamation: "Fault" or Strict Lia-
bility?, 15 OHio ST. L.J. 252, 267 70 nn. 62-64
(1954), for those states which have a similar
statute.
statement as a libel or slander, the Court
felt that it was not bound to do so.
Having treated defamation by broadcast
as sui generis, the Court considered how
plaintiff might prove that the defamation re-
ferred to him. 20 The conclusion of the Court
was that the plaintiff might proceed upon
either the "extrinsic fact" theory or the
"alternative defamation" theory.
In the broadcast which was allegedly de-
famatory, plaintiff's name was not used nor
did the actor who portrayed the corrupt
guard physically resemble plaintiff. Hence,
on its face the defamation did not refer to
plaintiff. In all actions for defamation, the
plaintiff must allege and prove that the def-
amation referred to him. Where, on its face
it is applicable to a plaintiff, there is no
difficulty. However, where such is not the
case, the plaintiff must show by extrinsic
facts that the defamation referred to him.2 1
In 1934 when Capone was being trans-
ported, two guards were stationed in Ca-
pone's car: plaintiff and the captain of the
guard. In the television broadcast, the guard
depicted as taking the bribe was not shown
to be a person in authority - such as the
captain of the guard. In light of this fact,
since plaintiff was the only other guard on
20 To maintain an action for defamation, the
plaintiff must show that the publication is refer-
able to him. Harris v. Santa Fe Townsite Co., 58
Tex. Civ. App. 506, 125 S.W. 77 (1910).
21 "In framing a declaration for defamation, when
the defamatory meaning of the communication or
its applicability to the plaintiff depends upon ex-
trinsic circumstances, the pleader avers their
existence in a prefatory statement called the 'in-
ducement.' In what is ordinarily called the 'collo-
quium,' he alleges that the publication was made
of and concerning the plaintiff and of and con-
cerning the extrinsic circumstances. The commu-
nication he sets forth verbatim and in the
'innuendo' explains the meaning of the words." 3
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 563, comment f (1938).
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the train, the Court felt that plaintiff ful-
filled the burden of proving that the defama-
tion referred to him.
The Court further stated that even if
plaintiff was not sufficiently identified by
extrinsic facts, both he and the other guard
could maintain an action. The Court did not
expressly indicate upon what grounds it
arrived at this conclusion but it seems that
it analogized from those cases allowing
members of a group, limited in number, to
recover for defamation of the group.2
The Court considered the facts of the
principal case to be unique and without
precedent. However, an analogous situation
seems to have been involved in Forbes v.
Johnson." The defendant in that case
charged that a promissory note, held by two
brothers, had been fraudulently altered,
without identifying the brother who had al-
legedly altered it. The defendant demurred,
as in the principal case, on the grounds that
the complaint did not justify the inference
that the charges were intended to refer to
the plaintiff. The court, however, stated:
"A charge that one or the other of two per-
sons committed a crime, is in truth, an im-
putation against both, and gives to each a
right of action. ' 24
It would appear that the most significant
aspect of this decision is not that it created
a new cause of action, but that this new
cause of action is actionable per se, that is,
actionable without proof of special dam-
ages.
25
The rule formulated in the principal case
22Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311
(S.D.N.Y. 1952); Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
Harland, 205 Miss. 380, 38 So. 2d 771 (1949).
23 50 Ky. 48 (1850).
2-4 Id. at 50 (dictum).
25 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 569, comment b
(1938).
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that defamatory broadcasts are actionable
per se will greatly benefit a plaintiff. Since
special damages mean actual pecuniary
damage, a plaintiff will not have to allege
and prove such damages because damages
would be presumed. 2 ' Since damages, there-
fore, would be presumed from a defamatory
broadcast, it might be argued that this would
give rise to frivolous and trivial claims.
However, those jurisdictions which have
made all defamation, whether oral or writ-
ten, actionable without proof of damage
have done so without undue difficulty.1
Traditionally, the main reason why a
written, and not an oral, defamation is
deemed to be actionable per se is the perma-
nence of form that a writing has.28 The
Court, however, rejected this permanence
of form criteria in the area of defamatory
broadcasts, and based its holding on the
enormous capacity for harm that radio and
television broadcasts have.
It is interesting to examine how New
York handles defamatory broadcasts. In
New York a defamatory statement read
from a script would be a libel, whether it
occurred on radio'9 or television." It is not
clear, however, whether an extemporaneous
defamatory remark, broadcast over televi-
sion, is a libel or slander.3 1
20 PROSSER, TORTS 593 (2d ed. 1955); SEELMAN,
LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER IN THE STATE OF
NEW YORK § 374 (1933).
27 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 26, at 595-96.
28 Hartmann v. Winchell, 296 N. Y. 296, 301, 73
N.E.2d 30, 34 (1947).
29 Ibid.
30 Landau v. Columbia, 205 Misc. 357, 128
N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
31 Shor v. Billingsley, 4 Misc. 2d 857, 158
N.Y.S.2d 476, aff'd, 4 App. Div. 2d 1017, 169
N.Y.S.2d 416 (1st Dep't 1957) (extemporaneous
remark on television was held to be libel). Contra,
Remington v. Bentley, 88 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y.
1949).
Traditionally, a libel was actionable per
se, that is, damages were conclusively pre-
sumed. '2 However, New York has adhered
to the libel per se and libel per quod distinc-
tion. 3 3 A libel which is defamatory on its
face is a libel per se and no damages need
be alleged or proved.3'4 On the other hand,
where the libel is not defamatory on its face,
but extrinsic facts are required to show the
defamatory meaning, it is a libel per quod
and special damages must be alleged and
proved. ,"
In those cases which have held a defama-
tory broadcast to be a libel, the defamatory
meaning was apparent on its face; 31 hence,
the courts did not consider whether the libel
per se and per quod distinction was appli-
cable to radio and television broadcasts.
However, in Davidson v. National Broad-
casting Co., 7 a plaintiff alleged that she was
libeled on a television program. The court
dismissed this cause of action on the grounds
that, since the defamation was not apparent
from the television presentation itself but
only because of extrinsic facts, plaintiff's
failure to allege special damages necessi-
tated dismissal of her cause of action .3
Hence, it would appear that in New York,
where a person has alleged he has been de-
famed by a broadcast, unless the defamatory
meaning is apparent on its face, a plaintiff
will have to allege and prove special dam-
ages.
32 Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REV. 839,
842 (1960).
33 O'Connell v. Press Publishing Co., 214 N.Y.
352, 108 N.E. 556 (1915); McNamara v. Goldan,
194 N.Y. 315, 87 N.E. 440 (1909).
:14Prosser, supra note 32, at 844.
35 Ibid.
3GHartmann v. Winchell, supra note 28; Shot v.
Billingsley, supra note 31.
37 26 Misc. 2d 936, 204 N.Y.S.2d 532 (Sup. Ct.
1960).
381d. at 938, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 535.
The question, therefore, is whether the
per se and per quod distinction should
be applied to defamatory broadcasts, or
whether all broadcasts should be actionable
per se. The basis for holding that a libel
per quod is not actionable until the extrinsic
facts are shown is that until those facts are
proved, no defamation is made out.3 9 In
most instances it is likely that the defama-
tory meaning would not be known to the
general public but only to a relatively few
people.40
The per se and per quod distinction
should be applied to defamatory broadcasts,
but only in the sense that if the defamatory
meaning of a statement is not apparent on
its face, a plaintiff should have the burden
of proving, through extrinsic facts, the de-
famatory meaning of the words. Once he has
proved the defamatory meaning of the
words, it would appear that courts have
their choice of three rules in determining
proof of damages.
At one extreme, a court could require
proof of special damages by a plaintiff. But,
as has been previously mentioned, special
damages are difficult, and often, impossible
to prove.4 1 At the other extreme, a court
could rule in all cases that damages would
be conclusively presumed, that is, the defa-
mation would be actionable per se. This
rule would seem to be justified because of
the tremendous capacity for harm that such
broadcasts have. The courts could also re-
fuse to apply the per se-per quod distinc-
tion to radio and television on the ground
that such a distinction would only add con-
fusion to an already confused situation.
4 2
39 Prosser, supra note 32, at 849.
40 Ibid.
41 Note, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 888 (1956).
42 MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 113 (1935).
9 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1963
An objection may be raised that since the
defamatory meaning of statements not de-
famatory on their face would be known only
to relatively few people, 43 such broadcasts
should not be actionable per se. There may
be two answers to this objection. First, it
makes no difference to the defamed party
whether the defamatory meaning is appar-
ent on its face or only through extrinsic
facts because he may be just as severely
injured in either case.4 4 Second, the jury
may consider the notoriety of extrinsic facts
among those to whom the defamatory state-
ment was broadcast in assessing the amount
of damages. 5
But there may be courts that are reluctant
to hold that all defamatory broadcasts are
actionable per se. Yet, the same courts may
consider proof of special damages where the
defamatory meaning is not apparent on its
face as too severe a burden to impose upon
a plaintiff. Naturally, where the defamatory
meaning is apparent on its face, it should be
actionable per se. There appears, however,
to be a middle ground a court may take
where the defamatory meaning is not ap-
parent on its face.
Whether a statement is defamatory on its
face or only because of extrinsic facts, it
has a tendency to diminish the respect or
confidence in which a plaintiff is held.46
This would seem to be especially so in the
area of defamatory broadcasts because of
the vast audiences that such broadcasts
have. In the light of this, a court could rea-
sonably conclude that when a statement is
not defamatory on its face, a plaintiff has
43 Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REV. 839
(1960).
44 HENN, "Libel-By-Extrinsic-Fact," 47 CORNELL
L.Q. 14,46 (1961).
45 Ibid.
46 PROSSER, TORTS 574 (2d ed. 1955).
 
